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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiffs, Tapadeera, LLC and Cary Hamilton, filed suit
alleging defendants owed Tapadeera $23,421.01 based on
plaintiffs' claim that defendants were in breach of a real
property sale contract. (R.p.l)

At the time of trial the parties

entered into a settlement agreement.

Plaintiff later sought

damages alleging that defendants had breached the settlement
agreement. (R.p.49)
A) COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiffs filed suit on August 13, 2008. (R.p.l)

In the

complaint there were several causes of action raised.

Defendants

filed an answer (R.p.19) and raised, as to some of plaintiffs'
causes of action, a statute of limitations defense. In response
to this defense, on January 12, 2009, plaintiff, by filing an
amended complaint, voluntarily dropped the challenged causes of
action.

(R.p.25)

One of the dropped causes of action was based

on a check that had been written by the Knowltons to Cary
Hamilton.

Cary Hamilton was a member of Tapadeera, LLC.

Cary

Hamilton was named as a plaintiff only because the check, on
which one of the original causes of action had been based, had
been made payable to C
Hamilton.

&

J Construction which was a dba of Cary

Tapadeera was the party in interest on the other

causes of action.

When the Amended Complaint was filed
1

plaintiffs overlooked removing Cary Hamilton's name from the
pleadings.
Trial was set for the 9th day of September, 2009. (Tr.p.4)
However, prior to the court taking any testimony, the parties
reached a settlement and so advised the court. (Tr.p.4)

The

settlement terms were then placed on the record. (Tr.pp.4-9)
After this settlement was reached the settlement fell apart
and plaintiffs filed a Motion for Judgment of Foreclosure.
Plaintiffs claimed that defendants had breached the settlement
agreement and that because of this breach the plaintiffs should
be allowed to foreclose.

A hearing was held.

(Tr.pp.11-38)

The

district court denied this motion and indicated that the
pleadings needed to be amended to add a new cause of action based
on the plaintiff's allegations that defendants had breached the
settlement agreement.

(Tr.pp.35-37)

In response to the court's directive plaintiffs' filed their
Second Amended Complaint on April 5, 2010.
Answer was filed on April 21, 2010.

(R.p.49) An Amended

(R.p.65) When plaintiffs

filed their Second Amended Complaint Cary Hamilton was dropped as
a plaintiff.
Plaintiff then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which was
supported by various affidavits.

(See Stoker Stipulation to

Augment) Defendants filed a counter affidavit. (See Jensen
2

Stipulation to Augment) A hearing was held.

(Tr.pp.47-76) The

court granted plaintiff's motion and judgment was entered for
plaintiff.

(R.p.89)

Defendants then filed a Motion to Reconsider

which motion was heard by the court on December 8, 2010.
(Tr.pp.78-99) The court denied defendants' Motion to Reconsider.
(R.p.94)
Plaintiff filed a Memorandum of Costs with a supporting
affidavit. (R.pp.78-81)

After the court denied defendants' Motion

for Reconsideration an amended Memorandum of Costs and an Amended
Affidavit were filed.

(R.pp.109-112)

Defendants filed an

objection to plaintiff's request for costs and fees.

( R. p. 92)

The court awarded costs but denied the request for attorney
fees. (R.p.124)
On January 19, 2011, defendants filed a Notice of
Appeal. (R.p.122) Based on the court's denial of attorney fees
plaintiff filed a Cross Appeal.

(R.p.137)

Following the filing of defendants' Notice of Appeal
defendants filed an objection to the court heading.

This

objection was based on the heading only showing Tapadeera as a
plaintiff. Defendants wanted to have Cary Hamilton added back in
as a plaintiff.

A hearing was held.

On April 27, 2011 the court

entered an order including Cary Hamilton as a plaintiff. (R.p.147)
The parties have filed two stipulations to augment the
3

record.

The first augments the record with the Paul Aston

deposition and with the Knowlton affidavit that was filed in
opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment.

The second

stipulation provides four affidavits submitted by plaintiff in
support of plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Tapadeera owned an 8 acre parcel of land in Minidoka County.
Tapadeera originally sold the 8 acres to a family by the name of
Holt.

The Holts wanted to build a house and they arranged

financing for the purchase.

However, the bank only wanted to

secure its loan against two of the acres.

Consequently, a legal

description was generated for the two acres and the bank financed
the house, taking security in the two acres. This resulted in two
legal descriptions filed of record, one for the two acre parcel
and one for the six acre parcel. (Aston, p.6)
After the transaction had taken place the Holts got into
financial difficulty which resulted in the bank foreclosing on
the two acre parcel.

Plaintiff ended up getting the 6 acres back

because of Holts' inability to pay.
After the two acres went back to the bank and after the 6
acres was returned to plaintiff's ownership the defendants
contacted plaintiff's agent, Cary Hamilton, and indicated they
were interested in buying the 6 acre parcel.
4

The defendants also

became aware of the availability of the two acre section on which
Holts had built their home.

The defendants purchased the two

acres from the bank and entered into an agreement with plaintiff
to purchase the 6 acres.

Defendants started making payments and

later took possession of the 6 acre parcel. (R.p.l)
After a few payments had been made Mr. Knowlton contacted
Cary Hamilton and requested a payoff.

The amount was identified

and Mr. Knowlton wrote a check payable to C&J Construction for
$23,421.00.
recorded.

A deed was delivered to Mr. Knowlton and then
At or about the time the deed was recorded Mr.

Knowlton stopped payment on his check.

Upon contact being made

with Mr. Knowlton he refused to make the payment for the check
and refused to return the property.

(Plaintiff's Complaint, R.

p. l)

Nothing happened for about 4 years.

After 4 years the

plaintiff filed suit seeking to foreclose against the property
and/or to collect the $23,421.00 that was owed.
The case was set for trial but before the trial began the
The terms of the settlement

parties negotiated a settlement.

agreement were recited in open court and placed on the record.
(Tr.pp.4-9).

The essentials of the settlement were that

plaintiff would apply to the county to have the 8 acres
subdivided, that defendants would cooperate in getting the 8
5

acres subdivided, and that once the subdivision was granted
defendants would pay plaintiff $23,421.01.
Plaintiff prepared an application to amend the subdivision
plat, obtained the Knowlton's signature on the application, paid
the necessary fees and costs and then submitted the application
to the county for the eight acres to be subdivided.

(Aston, p.15-

16)

A hearing was scheduled before the planning and zoning
committee (P&Z) to get preliminary approval to subdivide the 8
acres into two lots.

For some reason the county failed to send

notice of the hearing date to the Knowltons. (Aston, pp.20-22)
Cary Hamilton attended the P&Z hearing and presented the request.
P&Z gave initial approval to the subdivision and forwarded the
application to the County Commissioners for the final approval.
(Aston, p.23)

Before any further steps could be taken to deal

with the application Mr. Knowlton sent a letter to the county
withdrawing the application.

(Jeff Stoker Affidavit #1) (Aston,

pp.24-25) Since Mr. Knowlton was the title owner of the full 8
acre parcel the county would take no further steps, nor would
they consider the application, without Mr. Knowlton's agreement.
(Aston, pp.25-28)

The county sent a letter to Cary Hamilton

notifying plaintiff of the county's inability to take any further
action due to Mr. Knowlton's withdrawal of the application.
6

(Jeff

Stoker Affidavit #3) (Aston, pp.27-28)
Plaintiff, through his attorney, sent two letters to
defendants inviting them to reconsider their position. (Stoker
Affidavit #3)

Defendants did not respond except to confirm they

were not going to allow the application to go forward.

(Jeff

Stoker Affidavit #3)
ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Did the trial court err in granting plaintiff's Motion
for Summary Judgment?
2. Did the trial court err in denying plaintiff's request
for an award of attorney fees?
3. Did the trial court err in requiring that the heading be
amended to add Cary Hamilton as a plaintiff?
ARGUMENT

From a review of defendants' brief it appears defendants are
making four arguments.

The first is that there was a question of

fact which arose because:
Hamilton had been contacted with regard to the placement of
the easements and had failed to take into account the
Knowlton's concerns. (Ds' brief, p.10)
This argument is, in essence, an argument that plaintiff
breached its obligation, as per the settlement agreement, which
justified defendants' breach of the agreement.
Defendants' second argument is that because defendants did
7

not receive notice of the P&Z meeting that they were justified in
unilaterally preventing plaintiff from going forward with the
subdivision application. (Ds' brief, p.7)
Defendants' third argument is that plaintiff breached the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and that this justified
defendants "pulling the plug" on the subdivision application. (Ds'
brief, p.13)
Defendants raise, as their fourth challenge, the argument
that the underlying sale agreement was "illegal" and that for
this reason the court should invalidate the settlement agreement.
(Ds' brief, pp.13-15)
Defendants do not argue that the trial court was in error
when it ruled that defendants breached the settlement agreement.
It appears defendants have conceded they breached the agreement
by their interference with plaintiff's ability to get the subject
property subdivided and defendants' arguments are limited to why
they feel they were justified in so breaching the settlement
agreement.

Before addressing defendants' four arguments

plaintiff will address the validity of the settlement agreement
and the reasons why defendants were in breach of this agreement.
I. THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WAS A VALID CONTRACT AND
DEFENDANTS BREACHED THIS AGREEMENT

Some general principles regarding settlement agreements,
which are entered into with the purpose of compromising and
8

settling legal disputes, are set forth in Lawrence v. Hutchison,
146 Idaho 892, 204 P.3d 532(App. 2009).

The court stated the

following in regard to settlement agreements:
Stipulations for the settlement of litigation are regarded
with favor by the courts and will be enforced unless good
cause to the contrary is shown. (Citations omitted)
Generally, oral settlements do not have to be reduced to
writing to be enforceable. (Citations omitted) Oral
stipulations are binding when acted upon or entered on the
court records. 146 Ida@ 898
And also:
An agreement entered into in good faith in order to settle
adverse claims is binding upon the parties, and absent a
showing of fraud, duress or undue influence, is enforceable
either at law or in equity. (Citations omitted)
Oral settlement agreements must comply with the requirements
for contracts. (Citations omitted) Such a contract stands on
the same footing as any other contract and is governed by
the same rules that are applicable to contracts generally.
146 Ida. @898
The essential elements of the settlement agreement, entered
into by the parties before Judge Crabtree,

(Tr. pp.4-9) are as

follows:
1. Mr. Hamilton would prepare the subdivision application
and secure the documentation required by the county, including
the survey, to submit to Minidoka County.
It is uncontested that Mr. Hamilton complied with these
requirements and that the application, with supporting documents,
was prepared and submitted to the County.
2. The Knowltons, or either of them, was required to sign
9

the application.
Undisputed: Defendants signed the application.
3. Mr. Hamilton was required to submit the application to
Minidoka County and to go forward with the proceedings before the
county agencies.
Undisputed: Plaintiff's Mr. Hamilton did submit all
paperwork to Minidoka county and did appear at the P&Z hearing at
which time P&Z recommended the approval of the subdivision,
subject to conditions.
4. The Knowltons were required to be "supportive and to
assist" Mr. Hamilton in getting the subdivision application filed
and in getting the subdivision approved.

Specifically, the

Knowltons were to "be supportive" and to "cooperate as necessary
to get the subdivision approved." (Tr.p.5, 1.4-10)
A written stipulation was contemplated at the time the
settlement was placed on the record but no stipulation was ever
filed.
Mr. Hamilton did everything he was supposed to do. P&Z
approved the application but, due to an error by the county, no
notice of the P&Z meeting was ever sent to defendants.

Mr.

Hamilton had no knowledge that no notice was sent to
defendants. (Aston, p.21-22) Following the approval by P&Z, Mr.
Knowlton sent his February 22, 2010 letter to Minidoka County.
10

This letter, by its terms, absolutely negated the ability of Mr.
Hamilton to go forward with the application for approval of the
subdivision. (Stoker Affidavit #3)
In reviewing the terms of the settlement agreement, (Tr. pp.
4-9) it is clear there was a settlement agreement entered into,
that there was a meeting of the minds, with consideration.

Each

party had certain contractual obligations based on the
settlement.

As of the time Mr. Knowlton sent his letter to

Minidoka County Mr. Hamilton had complied with all of his
contractual obligations.

Mr. Hamilton's ability to complete his

contractual obligations was dependent on Mr. Knowlton's
cooperation and assistance.

Mr. Knowlton, by sending the letter

to Minidoka County withdrawing the application, not only failed
to cooperate but negated plaintiff's ability to take any further
action to get the subdivision approved.
The lower court determined, as a matter of law, that the
settlement agreement between the parties constituted a contract.
Plaintiff submits that there should be no question that an
agreement was entered into by the parties and defendants, in
their brief, have not made any arguments or challenges to the
validity of the settlement agreement.
The doctrine of prevention of performance is applicable to
this case and, because of defendants' unilateral action in
11

terminating plaintiff's ability to go forward with Minidoka
county,

the plaintiff was excused from obtaining, from the

county, final approval of the proposed subdivision.
In Ferguson v. City of Orofino, 131 Ida. 190, 193, 953 P.2d
630(App 1998) the court discussed the pertinent doctrine as
follows:
The doctrine of prevention of performance excuses a party
from fulfilling his contractual obligations when the party
to whom the obligation is owed unlawfully prevents the first
party from tendering performance.
Sullivan v. Bullock, 124
Idaho 738, 741-42, 864 P.2d 184, 187-188 (Ct. App.1993). See
also John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of
Contracts# 11-28 (3d ed. 1987); Walter H.E. Jaeger,
Williston on Contracts #1316 (3d ed.1968). The party whose
performance has been prevented may be entitled to
damages for the benefit of the bargain that would have been
earned through performance. Sullivan, 124 Idaho
at 743744, 864 P.2d at 189-90; Calamari, supra.
In Sullivan,

supra, the following is stated:

A previously stated, a party who is prevented from
performing by the party for whom the work is being done, may
treat the contract as breached and may recover damages
sustained. 124 Idaho@ 738
No appellate issue has been raised by defendants concerning
the amount of damages,

to which plaintiff was entitled, or the

trial court's decision giving defendants 30 days to pay the
$23,421.01 or to have the foreclosure go forward.
Plaintiff will now address defendants'

(R.pp.89-90)

four arguments. These

are the same arguments defendants raised in the lower court.
Plaintiff submits that all four arguments are frivolous,
12

unreasonable and without foundation.

If the court agrees then

such a determination will have bearing on the attorney fee issues
hereinafter discussed.
II. DEFENDANTS' EASEMENT ARGUMENTS ARE NOT MERITORIOUS
Paul Aston's testimony shows why defendant's easement
arguments are unsound. The following is a partial summary of the
information provided by Mr. Aston's testimony:
1. The Knowltons could have built the house they wanted to
build on the 6 acre portion of the land they owned as long as
they continued to have ownership of the full 8 acres.

(Aston, pp.

14-15, 32)
2. An application for an amended subdivision was submitted
by Cary Hamilton as per the settlement agreement. (Aston,p.15)
3. A plat, with easements, was also submitted. (Aston, p.16)
4. It was required that the plat show easements for road
access and for water supply to both parcels. (Aston, pp.16-18)
5. The County had no concerns about where these easements
were located so long as provision was made for road and water
access.

(Aston, p.18-19)

6. Knowltons did not get notice of the P&Z hearing because
the County computer did not print out a label.

(Aston, pp.21-22)

7. The P&Z commission approved the proposed amended
subdivision with the condition that the irrigation easements
13

would have to be acceptable to the irrigation district and that
the plat would have to comply with the county subdivision
ordinance. (Aston, p.24)
8. Following the P&Z approval the next step would have been
for plaintiff to obtain the approval of the irrigation district
and to then submit the matter at a hearing before the county
commissioners for their review.
9.

(Aston, p. 24)

This process was stopped by the Knowlton letter of

February 22nd, 2010. (Aston, pp.24-28)
10. If the Knowltons had withdrawn their letter the County
would have allowed the procedure to continue so long as the final
approval was obtained before February 18, 2011. If defendants had
withdrawn their letter the parties would have still had one year
to complete the process.

(Aston, p.28)

11. The lack of notice to the Knowltons could have been
corrected by simply re-noticing a second meeting before P&Z.
(Aston, p. 26)
12. The Knowltons' gripe about the easements was of no
significance because the Knowltons could have made any changes
they wanted with the easements before the matter was re-noticed
before P&Z.

(Aston, p.27)

13. The Knowltons could also have dedicated additional
easements for the water delivery and/or the road access without
14

changing the easements identified on the subdivision plat.
(Aston, pp.36-37, 39-40)
14. If the letter had been withdrawn the whole process could
have been completed in 2½ to 3 months.

(Aston, p.29)

15. Mr. Aston did not anticipate that there would have been
any problem getting the subdivision approved.

(Aston, p.30-31)

16. The 8 acre parcel did have two legal descriptions,
for two acres and one for six, filed of record.

one

This had been

done for financing purposes and was not illegal. (Aston, pp.33-34)
Cary Hamilton had a plat prepared for the proposed
subdivision that would have allowed defendants'

8

acre parcel to

be divided into two lots, a 2 acre lot and a 6 acre lot.

In

order to complete the subdivision, to the satisfaction of
Minidoka County, it was necessary that there be easements across
the two parcels in order to make sure each lot could be accessed
by a roadway and to make sure that water could be distributed
from the canal source to both parcels.

Easements were provided

for on the plat which meant that those easements would have been
dedicated easements if the subdivision had been approved.
The fact that easements were identified on the plat, whether
for the roadway or for the water supply, did not limit defendants
in imposing such other easements on the property as they saw fit.
The only County requirement was that there be provision for road
15

and water access.

The county didn't care if the Knowltons made

provision for any other easement they saw fit.

Consequently, the

Knowltons had the unlimited right to put a roadway easement any
place they wanted and they could also have placed a water
easement any place they wanted.

This was because they were the

sole owners of the 8 acres which gave them the right, and
ability, to make these decisions and changes regardless of the
subdivision plat.
Defendants argue that because they had some concerns about
the location of the easements that they were justified in sending
their letter to the County that stopped the subdivision process.
However, as clearly demonstrated by Paul Aston's testimony, to
which there is no challenge in the record, defendants' easement
concerns could have been dealt with in one of two ways.

The

first was that prior to a second hearing before P&Z the easements
could have been changed to suit the Knowltons. The second was
that the easements identified on the initial plat could have been
left on the proposed plat without any change and the Knowltons
could have created other easements later on without going back
through the subdivision process.

Defendants argument that the

trial court was speculating, when it determined that the
Knowltons' complaints could have been addressed with little, or
no, difficulty if they had simply cooperated, is very weak.
16

The

court reached the correct conclusion on this issue and
defendants' arguments that the judge was "speculating" has no
merit because it was defendants' actions that denied plaintiff
the right to go forward with the process in order to find out if
the subdivision would have ultimately been approved.
The court is referred to the March 5, 2010 Stoker letter to
Mr. Jensen advising that the Knowltons'

"gripes" could be

addressed and dealt with and that the plaintiffs were willing to
meet to resolve the issues.

(Stoker Affidavit #3)

No meeting was

ever arranged or requested by defendants. For all of these
reasons there is no merit whatsoever to defendants' argument in
regard to the easements.
The defendants second argument, that they didn't receive
notice of the P&Z meeting, is also without merit because, as
heretofore indicated, the P&Z meeting could easily have been renoticed which would have allowed Knowltons to participate in the
re-noticed hearing.
III. THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED TO THIS CASE.

It appears that defendants' covenant of good faith argument
is a rehash of the easement and the notice arguments.

Defendants

argue that Cary Hamilton did something wrong or that he acted in
bad faith but defendants fail to identify anything he did wrong
although defendants again discuss the easement situation and the
17

notice issue.
Returning again to the easement argument, this argument is
not meritorious for the reasons previously set forth. Another
reason why this argument is not meritorious is that the Knowltons
signed the application that was submitted to the County.

They

had the opportunity, before signing the application, if they saw
the need, to wait to sign until any issues they had were
resolved.

By signing the application defendants, it is

submitted, waived any arguments they had to the placement of any
easements.
As indicated in Paul Aston's deposition, the lack of notice
to the Knowltons was in major part because the county's computer
did not print a label to send notice to the Knowltons.

However,

even if no notice was received this problem could easily have
been corrected by just re-noticing the P&Z meeting at which time
Knowltons could have appeared.

The other problem with

defendants' argument, in this regard, is that it was not Cary
Hamilton's fault that the notice did not get to defendants-it was
the County's.
The other problem with defendants' argument is that even if
they didn't receive any notice of the P&Z meeting, their
presence, or absence, at the P&Z meeting wasn't of any
significance unless they wanted to complain and object to the P&Z
18

approving the application.

The objective was to get the

application approved but the more one listens to defendants'
arguments the more one becomes convinced that defendants never
wanted the application approved because they did not want to pay
the money.

The application was approved.

That should have been

the goal for both parties and the defendants should have been
glad that step one of the process had been completed
successfully.
As indicated by Paul Aston,

the P&Z approval was subject to

the condition that the irrigation company, and the County as to
the easements, be satisfied.

At the anticipated hearing before

the County Commissioners the easement issue could have been dealt
with and the easements moved and the Knowltons would have been
given the opportunity to attend the hearing.
There is a significant likelihood that the Knowltons
intended to do whatever it took to sabotage the process had they
attended the P&Z hearing.

If the approval was obtained they had

to pay the money which, it appears,

they did not want to do.

Another problem with defendants'

"covenant of good faith and

fair dealing" argument is that defendants are raising this as a
defense but they did not raise this as a defense in their answer.
(R.p.19,65)

Defendants first presented this as a defense at the

time of the summary judgment motion.
19

An analysis of the principles of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing demonstrates that if there was a breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing that it was the
defendants that breached this implied covenant.
In Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho 764, 768, 203
P.3d 694(2009)

the general rules for the application of this

doctrine are set forth. The following is a synopsis of these
rules:
1. The covenant only arises "regarding terms agreed to by
the parties".
2. No covenant will be implied that is contrary to the terms
of the contract.
3. A violation only occurs when "either party .... violates,
nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit of the .. .
contract .... " Idaho First Natl Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods,
Idaho at 288, 824 P.2d at 863
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(citations omitted)

4. A person claiming a breach of this covenant must identify
a specific term of the agreement that the other party violated,
nullified or significantly impaired.
5. The contract terms are not overridden by the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.
The terms of the settlement agreement were that plaintiff
would file an application to get the defendants' 8 acres
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subdivided, that plaintiff would file the plat and otherwise take
care of the procedural steps necessary to effectuate the
subdividing of the property.

The defendants were to cooperate

with the process and, upon the approval of the amended
subdivision, pay plaintiff $23,421.01. These were basically all
of the terms.

There was no term of the settlement agreement that

discussed any easements or the location of any easements.
Defendants' brief states that because the "placement of the
easements and the giving of notice were important factors to the
Knowltons" that somehow the Knowltons' displeasure with these
issues constituted, on the part of plaintiff, a breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Defendants do not point out any term of the agreement that
plaintiff is supposed to have violated, nullified or
significantly impaired.

As previously set forth in this brief,

even if the easement issue needed to be addressed there was
plenty of leeway for this to be done without the Knowltons
sending the letter to the County that completely terminated the
application process.
The end result of this analysis is that the Knowltons, other
than signing the application, did not cooperate in any way with
the process of getting the subdivision amended.

On the contrary,

the Knowltons did everything they could to stop the process.
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If

either party breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
it was the defendants because they,

in bad faith,

frustrated

plaintiff's ability to accomplish the primary objective of the
settlement agreement, i.e. to obtain Minidoka County's approval
of the subdivision of the 8 acres.
Defendants go on to argue that whether or not the County
would have approved the subdivision "is speculative" on the part
of the trial court.

The problem with this argument is that

defendants' conduct, in sending the letter to the County and in
failing to withdraw the letter after being given the opportunity
to do so, resulted in plaintiff being denied the opportunity to
even try to get the subdivision approved.

Again, as stated by

Mr. Aston in his deposition, he had every expectation that the
County would have approved plaintiff's application to amend the
subdivision plat.

(Aston, p.30-31)

IV. THE ORIGINAL SALE AGREEMENT WAS NOT VOID BASED ON A
VIOLATION OF AN ORDINANCE

Defendant argues that the original real property sale
agreement, that was entered into between the parties, was a
contract that was void and against public policy. This argument
is based on defendants' position that there was a provision in
the Minidoka County Ordinance that made it a misdemeanor for any
person to violate a provision of the subdivision/zoning
ordinance.
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Even if this public policy defense had any merit to start
with, which it did not, any such defense was made moot when the
parties entered into their settlement agreement. In addressing
defendants' arguments in this regard plaintiff will first
demonstrate that this defense, from the beginning, was without
foundation in law or in fact.
The parties entered into a real estate purchase contract
wherein the plaintiff would sell to the defendants a six acre
parcel of real property. (R.l)

Plaintiff's obligations, that

constituted the consideration plaintiff was giving in the
contractual situation, was to transfer the ownership of a six
acre parcel to defendants.
Defendants' argument is that the creation of two legal
descriptions involving the 8 acres, which took place before
defendants had any involvement whatsoever with the 8 acres,
constituted the creation of a subdivision that did not have the
blessing of the County Commissioners and that, therefore, there
was an "illegal" subdivision.
In this regard, defendants make an inaccurate statement in
their brief,

(Ds' B.p.15) when the following is stated:

There is no dispute in the factual record that the
subdivision performed by Hamilton was illegal and in
violation of the Minidoka County ordinance."
This statement is totally misleading and incorrect. When the
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so called "illegal subdivision" was created it was created for
financing reasons.

The Holts, who were the original buyers of

the property from plaintiff, wanted to build a house and to do so
they had to have bank financing.

The bank only wanted security

in a two acre parcel and so a two acre parcel was created in
order to facilitate the financing of the home construction.
noted by Paul Aston,

As

the statute prohibits land divisions for

"developmental purposes",

it does not prohibit land divisions for

financing purposes. (Aston Depo, pp.33-34)
The Minidoka Ordinance did not prohibit the sale or the
transfer of ownership of real property.

The County Ordinance

only prevented a person from getting a building permit to build
on the property if the property did not comply with the zoning
and subdivision ordinance.
In Farrell v. Whiteman,

146 Idaho 604, 609,

200 P.3d 1153

(2008), there is fairly extensive discussion about contracts that
are considered "illegal contracts".

As part of this discussion

the following is stated:
Generally, when the consideration for a contract explicitly
violates a statute, the contract is illegal and
unenforceable. Barry v. Pac. W. Constr. Inc., 140 Idaho 827,
832, 103 P.3d 440, 445(2004). In most cases the court will
leave the parties to an illegal contract as it finds them.
And also:
.... (O)nly those contracts which involve consideration that
is expressly prohibited by the relevant prohibitory statute
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are void. See Miller v. Haller,
607, 614 (1996) ......... .

129 Idaho 345, 352, 924 P.2d

Such statutes must be narrowly construed and only those
contracts violating express provisions thereof will be
deemed illegal. Id.
The action of selling and/or transferring real property did
not violate the Minidoka Ordinance. This was the consideration
given by plaintiff in the transaction.
about this action.

There was nothing illegal

Defendants are basically ignoring all legal

principles about what makes a contract void because of statutory
violation.

This is a case of "don't confuse me with the facts

because my mind is already made up".

The Minidoka Ordinance had

absolutely no provisions that were violated when plaintiff agreed
to sell 6 acres to defendants.
Defendant cites Kunz v. Lobo Lodge,

Inc.,

133 Idaho 608,

990

P.2d 1219(App.1999) as support for their "illegality" argument.
However, this case is distinguishable.

In Kunz the court

determined that a lease that provided for the placement of
illegal billboards could not be enforced.

The reason for this

was that the consideration to be given by one party, the
placement of the billboards, was in direct violation of an
ordinance.

In the present case the sale of real property was not

in violation of any ordinance and, in fact, no part of the
consideration given by either party, was in violation of the
Minidoka ordinance.
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To the extent any argument even exists that there was a
violation of the Minidoka ordinance,

this argument is nullified

by the fact that Knowltons ultimately purchased the 2 acre and
the 6 acre parcels putting all the property back in the ownership
of one person.
The next reason defendants' argument, on this issue,

fails

is because of the settlement agreement.
There is clearly no "illegality" defense to the settlement
agreement.

Defendants are making no such claim.

Consequently,

the only argument is as to the original sale agreement.

The

issue then arises as to what effect the settlement agreement had,
or has, on any defenses defendants may have had to the original
contract.
Some principles from Idaho case law that should be
dispositive of defendants' arguments on this issue are:
1. An agreement entered into in good faith in order to
settle adverse claims is binding upon the parties and absent a
showing of fraud,

duress or undue influence,

is enforceable.

Young Elec. Sign Co. v. State, 135 Idaho 804, 25 P.3d 117(2001)
Defendants have made no claim that there was any bad faith,
fraud, duress or undue influence involved insofar as their
entering into the settlement agreement.

There are,

it is

submitted, no other defenses that can be raised to the settlement
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agreement.
2. In an action brought to enforce an agreement of
compromise and settlement, made in good faith, the court will not
inquire into the merits or validity of the original claim.
Goodman v. Lothrop, 143 Idaho 622, 151 P.3d 818(2007)

As set forth in Goodman any defenses or claims defendants
may have had to plaintiff's original causes of action, are not
available as defenses to enforcement of the settlement agreement.
As a result of the settlement agreement defendants' efforts to
resurrect a defense they raised to plaintiff's original claim is
inappropriate and without merit.
It is submitted that all of the arguments raised by
defendants are smoke screens.

There is no substance to any of

the four arguments raised and the arguments made seem to be
nothing more than weak efforts to avoid paying the money owed.
V. CARY HAMILTON WAS PROPERLY DROPPED AS A PLAINTIFF

The judge, at the tail end of the proceedings in the lower
court, entered an order that directed that Cary Hamilton be added
back in as a plaintiff in this case. (R.p.147)
After the settlement agreement fell apart the court advised
plaintiff that if plaintiff wanted to go forward with a cause of
action, based on the settlement agreement, that the pleadings
needed to be amended.

A Second Amended Complaint was filed and,
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at the time of the filing, plaintiffs' counsel opted to drop Cary
Hamilton as a plaintiff.
A motion had been filed to do this previously but no hearing
was ever held. At the time the original complaint was filed Cary
Hamilton was named as a plaintiff because the check that was
written, the check that defendants later stopped payment on, was
made payable to C&J Construction which was Cary Hamilton's dba.
Defendants contested the check cause of action because the
statute of limitations had expired at the time the complaint was
filed.
action.

Plaintiffs then voluntarily dropped the check cause of
After the cause of action was dropped Cary Hamilton had

no further interest in the action and, consequently, should have
been dismissed as a party to the action.

Plaintiffs filed their

Second Amended Complaint on April 5, 2010. Defendants filed an
answer.

No objection was made to the dropping of Cary Hamilton

as a plaintiff until a year after the Second Amended Complaint
was filed.
The court ordered that plaintiff could file a Second Amended
Complaint.

It was filed and Cary Hamilton was not listed as a

plaintiff.

Defendants should have had some obligation, if they

saw fit,

to note any objection they may have had to Cary Hamilton

being dropped as a plaintiff when they filed their answer.

Even

using the time limits in Rule 60(b) suggests that after 6 months
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defendants have waived any objection they might have had to the
dropping of Cary Hamilton as a plaintiff.

For these reasons it

is suggested that the trial court erred in entering the order
requiring that Cary Hamilton be included as a plaintiff.
VI. PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES

Plaintiff requested attorney fees in the trial court.
Defendants objected but their objection was limited to an
objection that the fees were excessive.

(R.p.92)

Costs were

awarded but the request for fees was denied. (R. p.124)
appealed from the court's ruling on this issue.

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

submits that attorney fees should have been awarded for a portion
of the legal fees plaintiff incurred.
Plaintiff submitted, as part of the Memorandum of Costs and
the supporting Affidavit, a full history of the legal work that
was involved with the case. The fees can be addressed in their
totality but they also can be divided and plaintiff submits that
the fees should be addressed under two separate classifications.
The first classification is the legal fees plaintiff incurred
prior to the date of the settlement agreement.

The second is the

fees that were incurred following the time the parties entered
into the settlement agreement on 9/9/09.
Plaintiff's counsel devoted, as of the time the amended
costs and fee bill was submitted to the court, a total of 108.33
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hours.

(R.pp.112-119)

Of this total plaintiff's counsel devoted

66.03 hours prior to the settlement of 9/9/09 and 42.3 hours were
devoted to the case following the time the parties entered into
the settlement agreement.

Plaintiff's hourly rate was $200 per

hour which breaks down as follows:

presettlement: $13,206.00,

post settlement: $8,460.00.
There is no question that plaintiff was the prevailing party
in this case.

Plaintiff requested fees under I.e. 12-120 and

under I.e. 12-121.

(R. pp.112-113)

Plaintiff submits that fees should have been awarded for the
total amount of time involved in going forward with the case.
However, at a minimum the trial court should have awarded
plaintiff the fees incurred to enforce the settlement agreement.
Plaintiff suggests that there are two reasons why post
settlement fees should be awarded.

The first is under I.e. 12-

120 and the second is under I.e. 12-121.
VII. FEES SHOULD BE AWARDED BASED ON I.C. 12-120

When the parties entered into the settlement agreement the
case was basically resolved from the Knowltons' standpoint
because, after the agreement was entered into, the Knowltons
really didn't have to do anything but sign the application that
was to be submitted to the County to have the amended subdivision
approved.

Plaintiff was responsibile to pay the costs and to
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take the action necessary to get the subdivision approved.
Defendants' only other obligation was to pay plaintiff, after
plaintiff finished the subdivision process, the sum of
$23,421.01.
After defendants, without justification, sent the letter to
the County withdrawing the subdivision application the plaintiff
was entitled to receive, as damages, the sum of $23,421.01 from
defendants.

Plaintiffs, after the settlement agreement was

reached and then breached, sent two separate letters to
defendants requesting that defendants either withdraw their
opposition to the subdivision process or requesting the payment
of the $23,421.01.

(See Stoker Affidavit #3) The first of these

letters was sent on February 23,
March 5, 2010.

2010 and the second was sent on

Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint,

adding the cause of action based on the settlement agreement, on
April 5, 2010.
I.e. 12-120 normally applies to a situation where a
complaint is filed after a 10 day written demand for payment.
However,

it is submitted that in this situation the Second

Amended Complaint became the complaint for damages based on the
settlement agreement.

The demand letter was sent on February

23rd and the suit was filed more than 10 days after the demand
letter was sent. Plaintiff submits that the provisions of I.e.
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12-120 are applicable, as to the settlement agreement, and
attorney fees should have been awarded by the trial court, if not
for the full amount of legal fees,

then, at a minimum, for legal

fees incurred after 9/9/10.
VIII. ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD BE AWARDED BASED ON I.C.

12-121.

Attorney fees, under I.e. 12-121, may be awarded if the
defenses raised are frivolous, unreasonable or without
foundation. See,

e.g., Jerry J. Joseph v. Vaught,

117 Idaho 555,

789 P.2d 1146(App.1990)
Attorney fees should be awarded when there is no legitimate,
triable issue of fact and where a party asserts legal or factual
issues which have no support in the law or the facts. See, e.g.,
Turner v. Willis,

119 Idaho 1023, 812 P.2d 737(1991)

The award of attorney fees, under I.C. 12-121, is a matter
of discretion and it is necessary that the court determine that
there was an abuse of discretion before the court will overrule
the trial court's exercise of discretion. See, e.g., Treasure
Valley Concrete,

Inc.

v. State, 132 Idaho 673,

978 P.2d 233(1999)

The trial court did deny attorney fees under I.e. 12-121 but
only makes the following statement as to said denial:
The court does not find that the defendant's defense was
brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably, or without
foundation. Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to an
award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12121. (R.p.128)
32

The test, to determine if a trial court abused it's
discretion in failing to award fees,

is a three-factor test.

The

three steps are set forth in Burns v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480,
486, 65 P.3d 502(2003), as follows:
To determine whether the award of attorney fees was an abuse
of discretion this Court applies the three-factor test from
Sun Valley Shopping Center: '() whether the trial court
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of
its discretion and consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3)
whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise
of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power
Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000(1991)'
The trial court properly determined that awarding fees under
12-121 was a matter of discretion.

However, it is submitted that

the trial court's decision does not meet the other two aspects of
the "three-factor test".
It should be noted that plaintiff only sought fees, under
12-121, for the attorney fees that were required to enforce the
settlement agreement.

(R.p.113) The trial court, in its decision,

does not tell us whether or not the court was looking at the
totality of the case, which would include the defenses raised to
the original causes of action, when the court made the
determination that "defendant's defense" was not frivolous, etc.
Consequently, it is impossible to tell whether or not the court
did, or did not, decide that defendants' four arguments raised to
the cause of action to enforce the settlement agreement were
33

frivolous or not.
The next problem with the court's decision is that the court
states that it did not find that the "defendants defense",
singular, was raised frivolously, etc.

in the

It is impossible to know

which of the so-called defenses defendants presented is the one
the court determined was legitimate.
The third problem lies with whether or not the "trial court
reached its decision by an exercise of reason."

Plaintiff

submits that it did not.
Although set forth previously, defendants have never argued
that they did not breach the agreement by failing to cooperate.
There only arguments have been that they were justified in
withdrawing the application that had been submitted to the
County, and thereby breaching their obligation to "cooperate",
because of the following reasons: 1) the easement argument; 2)
the notice issue; 3) the good faith and fair dealing argument;
and 4) the public policy argument based on defendants' argument
that the original sale agreement was void because of the Minidoka
subdivision argument.
As hereinbefore discussed there is, and was, absolutely no
justification for the four arguments defendants have made.

This

becomes even more evident in light of the two letters sent to
defense counsel wherein plaintiff endeavored to convince
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defendants that plaintiff was willing to work out any problems
that existed with the application.

If defendants had met, as

requested, with plaintiff then the easement issue could have been
addressed.

It really didn't matter to plaintiff where the

easements were placed.

Plaintiff had nothing to gain, or lose,

by the location of the easements and so there was no reason why
plaintiff would not have been willing to make those changes.

As

to the notice problem, it would not have been any major problem
to just re-notice the P&Z meeting which would have allowed
defendants to attend the P&Z meeting.
As previously set forth the argument about the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing is nothing more than the easement and
notice arguments wrapped up in a different package.

It is

submitted that neither the case law, or the facts involved, give
any justification to the defendants' covenant of good faith
argument.
Finally, there is no basis in case law, or in the undisputed
facts of this case, that justify raising the argument that the
court is, by enforcing the settlement agreement, enforcing a
contract that is void and against public policy.
Because defendants had absolutely no justifiable defense to
the enforcement of the settlement agreement there was no basis
for the court to make any determination other than a
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determination that the defendants' four defenses were frivolous,
etc.
IX. ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD BE AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF FOR
THE APPELLATE WORK

Plaintiff seeks attorney fees on appeal under I.C. 12120(1), based on I.e. 12-121/123 and based on Rules 11 and 54.
Plaintiff incorporates, as part of this request, the discussions
hereinbefore set forth in this brief concerning why the trial
court should have awarded fees.
Under 12-120, the amount plead in the Second Amended
Complaint was under $25,000.00(R.p.53-55), a demand letter was
sent more than 10 days before the filing of the Second Amended
Complaint (Stoker Affidavit #3) and the amount awarded was less
than $25,000.00(R.p.89). Consequently, fees should be awarded for
the appeal.
In regard to the award of fees based on I.C. 12-121,

the

following principles appear to be applicable:
1. If all an appeal does is invite the appellate court to
second guess the trial court then fees should be awarded.
Dechambeau v. Estate of Smith, 132 Idaho 568, 976 P.2d 922(1999);
Crowley v.

Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509, 1891 P.3d 435(2007)

There is nothing in defendants' brief that does any more
than ask the appellate court to "second guess" the trial court.
2. If a party's appellate arguments totally lack foundation
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then an award of fees is appropriate.

Karson v. Harris,

140

Idaho 561, 97 P.3d 428(2004)
Defendants, in their brief, provide no reason why the
easement and notice issues could not have been addressed, and
dealt with, if the defendants had withdrawn their opposition to
the county entertaining the subdivision application.

In fact,

the information available to the trial court established that the
easement issue was no issue at all, the notice issue could have
been dealt with by re-noticing the P&Z hearing and the public
policy statutory argument never was supported by any law or
facts, especially in regard to the settlement agreement on which
the summary judgment was based.
3. Both an attorney and his client can be held responsible
for attorney fees when there is no good faith basis for an
appeal. MacLeod v. Reed, 126 Idaho 669, 889 P.2d 103

(App.1995)

The attorney has the duty to determine that there is a
legitimate basis for an appeal before he ever files it and both
the attorney, and the defendants, in this matter knew, or should
have known, that the appeal was brought in bad faith and that the
four arguments raised were not meritorious.
4. If the position advocated by a party is "plainly
fallacious and, therefore not fairly debatable" then fees should
be awarded. Associates NW,

Inc.

v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605, 733
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It is submitted that the facts in this case, and the
applicable legal principles, overwhelmingly suggest that the
present appeal is without foundation and the trial court's ruling
granting the summary judgment is not "fairly debatable".
CONCLUSION
'
For the reasons set forth in this brief
the court should

uphold the trial court's granting of summary judgment on the
settlement agreement, should award fees and costs on appeal and
should remand this matter to the trial court to complete the
foreclosure process if the monies owed are not paid.
Respectfully submitted this

;2/c
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day of September, 2011.
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